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cert to CAl (Aldrich, Campbe ll,
Gignou x [DJ] )

No. 79-244
UNITED S'l'ATES

U}-e_~~~~--o~~~£1~

v.
SALVUCHI a nd ZACKULAR

Whvo

-s

.

Federal/Criminal

Time ly

SUMMARY:

In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), /)
-----/(ld /)~
the Court held that criminal defendants have "automatic
£~J I~
standing" to challenge Fourth Amendm e nt violations in the

-
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~]at .
- fiK.law.

seizure of it ems underlying a charge of a possessory offens e.
The SG asks the Court to d e cide whether Jones rem a ins good
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Zackular and Salvucci were

indicted f or unlaw f ul posse ~s ion 6f checks stolen from the
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mails. 18 U.S.C. § 1708.

Agents , act1' ng pursuant to a warrant,

had seized the checks from an apartment rented by zackular's

-

wife.

The district court held that the affadav 1't supporting
the warrant did
not establish probable
caus;
""--_____...,
CAl agreed ~nd
also concluded that Jones gave resps "automat 1·c standing" to
seek exclusion of the evidence.

.

I

It wrote:

To contest a
search and seizure on Fourth Amendment grounds,
a defendant must have either "actual standing" or
"automatic standing." To have actual ·sta11ding, a
de~;t"establish a legitimate and reasonable
expectation of privacy in the premises searched or
the property seized. Rakas v. Illinois, 47 U.S.L.W.
4025 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1978) ; see Brown v. United States,
411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973). We agree with the Government that neither defendant has actual standing
to contest the lawfulness of the search and seizures.
Nejther defendants has established a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises searched or the
property seized, nor has either of them ever claimed
a proprietary or possessory interest in the premises
or the checks. I d.
Both defendants, however, have automatic standing to object to the search and seizures under Jones
v. fJniiedStates, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In Jones, the
Supreme Court held that a defendant has autorpatic
standi:nz to challenge the JegaiTty of ~arch or sei?..ure if charged with a crime that includes, as an essential element of the offense charged, possession
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(

c

of the seized evidence at the time of the contested
search and seizure. The Court offered a twofold rationale in support of this rule: ( 1) the unfairness
of requiring the defendant to assert a proprietary or
possessory interest in the premises searched or the
items seized when his statements could later be used
at trial to prove a crime of possessfon; and (2) the
vice of prosecutorjal self-contradiction, that is, a)lowing the Government to allege possession as part
of the crime charged, and yet deny that there was
possession sufficient for standing purposes. !d. at 26165; Brown v. United States, supra at 229.
The fitst part of this twofold rationale was essentiall r eliminated by the Supreme Court's holding
in Si1!!!J!&nS v. nited States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94
(1968), that a defendant's testimony in support of a
motion to suppress may not be used against him at
trial. The S~preme Court itself has questioned, but
unfortunately not decided, whether the second prong
of the Jones rationale, prosecutorjal self-contradictjon,
alone justifies the continued vitality of the doctrine
of automatic standing. See rRalcas v. Illinois, suvra
at 4027 n.4; Brown v. United States, supra at 228,
229. Since the Supreme Court first questioned the
vitality of this doctrine in B1·own, there has been a
split of authority as to whether the doctrine survives.
~
Compare United States v. Riquelnty, 572 F.2d 947,
950-51 (2d Cir. 1978), and United States v. Boston,
510 F.2d 35, ~7-38 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 990 (1975) (doctrine survives) with United
States v. Delgu.yd, 542 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1976)
(doctrine does not survive). Until the Supreme ·
Court rules on this question, we are not prepared
to hold that. the automatic standing rule of Jones
has been implicitly overruled by Simmons. That is
an issue which the Supreme Court must resolve.
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- 4 The SG cites other cases involving this issue.

Compare

United States v. Grunsfeld, 558 F.2d 1231, 1241-42 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, i134 U.S. 872, 1016 (1978)

(following

Delguyd; alternate holdings); United States v. Smith, 495 F.2d
668, 670 (lOth Cir. 1974)

(Brown mandates inquiry into

existence of "personal right protected by Fourth Amendment");
United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 896 (5th Cir. 1978)
bane)

(dissenting opinion of five judges)

(en

(automatic standing

should be rejected; "Simmons . . • gave all but the coup de
grace); id. at 892 (majority opinion)

("serious doubts" in

light of Simmons, but finding standing on alternate ground),
with United States v. Ullrich, 580 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir.
1978)

(judges dissenting in Edwards feel bound by Jones and

prior Fifth Circuit authority to apply automatic standing
rule); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1977)
("misgivings," but rule persists in circuit pending Supreme
Court rejection of Jones); United States v. Galante, 547 F.2d
733, 737 (2d Cir. 1976)

("overruling Jones is propeily a matter

for the Supreme Court"); United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d
1296, 1299 (8th Cir. 1977)

(Simmons does not remove "vice of

prosecutorial self-contradiction''; rule to be retained "in the
absence of a clear mandate from the Supreme Court").

See also

United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165, 1167 (7th Cir. 1976)
(7th Cir. 1976)

(articulating tule but distinguishing case);

United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1978)
(same); United States v. Dye, 508 _F.2d 1226, 1232-34 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975).
DISCUSSION :

This case appears to raise a substantial and

recurring question that divides the circuits, interests the SG,

/
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(

and has generated specific invitations from the lower courts to
reevaluate a precedent that this Court has itself questioned .
I recommend a

CFR.* Unless resps identify a procedural

obstacle to effective review, I also recommend a grant.
There is no response. ~
\-<,F""'i\-<) r0 c- ~ e9/11/79

Coenen

l()C\~' u c 'L~-

·

opn in petn

(1

*The respondents have fil
I assume that, under the
appropriate in a seemin

~

a waiver of their right to respond.
circumstances, a CFR might still be
certw~rthy case.
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11/30/79
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No.

79-244 and No.

-hrrt~~
79-5146 raise the question whether
v~

the automatic standing rule of Jones
257 (1960) should be overruled.
issue
illegal

presented

in

No.

arrest

issue.

79-244,

Therefore,

United States, 362 U.S.

The Jones question is the only
but
I

79-5146

would

also

raises

an

~No. 79~ and

hold No. 79-5146.
No.

79-393 raises the closely related question whether

a possessory interest in contraband confers Rctual standing to
challenge a search and seizure.

As the cert. memo notes, there

are some problems with the record with this case,

but

they do

not appear substantial enough to prevent the Court from deciding
the actual standing issue.

Accordingly,

I

would

393 and set it down for argument with No. 79-244.
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

David

DATE:

March 21, 1980

RE:

No. 79-244, United States v. Salvucci and Zackular; No. 79-

5146, Rawlings v. Kentucky

Main Question Presented:

Whether
doctrine
permits

of
a

the

Jones

Court
v.

defendant

suppression

of

should

United
charged

evidence

abandon the

"automatic standing"

States,

362

with

possessory

regardless

a

of

U.S.

his

257

(1960),

offense

relationship

which

to
to

seek
its

seizure?

INTRODUCTION:

The
Rawlings,

Salvucci

however,

case

involves

---

. onl ¥

automatic

standing.

concerns an arrest issue as well as a couple of

miscellaneous questions.

I will focus first on automatic standing,

and pick up the additional issues in Rawlings at the end of the memo.

BACKGROUND:

2.
Salvucci -- Pursuant to a search warrant, the Massachusetts
State Police found 12 checks in the apartment of Zackular's mother.
The checks had been stolen from the mails.

The opinion below and the

briefs submitted in this case provide no direct information as to the
methods employed in the search.

Indeed, the opinion of CA 1 repeated

the

for

error

in

the

application

a

search

warrant,

which

had

identified the apartment as belonging to Zackular's wife rather than
his mother.

In any event, we do not know how the police carne across

the checks, or how the checks had been stored.

This lack of facts

may make responsible resolution of the case somewhat difficult.
Salvucci and Zackular successfully argued before the DC and
CA1 that the stolen checks should be suppressed as evidence because
the affidavit underlying the warrant was inadequate.

CA 1 rejected

the Government's claim that

challenge the

search

of

Appeals
Jones

third

conceded

and

( 1978),

a

the

party's

that

Court's

they had no
apartment,

there

was

opinion

but concluded that

some

standing to

citing Jones.
tension

in Rakas

v.

between

Illinois,

The

Court of

the
439

rule

u.s.

in
128

until this Court resolved that tension,

Jones should be followed.
Rawlings -- Rawlings was in the horne of Marquess with four.
other people when the Kentucky State Pol ice arrived with an arrest
warrant for Marquess.

Immediately before their arrival, Rawlings had

asked

store

Vanessa

reluctantly,

Cox

to

his

drugs

in

her

purse.

and then asked him to remove the drugs.

She

He agreed to

take back the drugs, but said he had to use the bathroom first.
he

returned,

the

police

had

already

arrived.

through the apartment looking for Marquess.

The

agreed

police

When
walked

They did not find him,

3.

but

smelled

burnt marijuana

seeds on a mantel.
others

while

a

and

saw what

appeared

to be marijuana

The pol ice then netained Rawlings and the
During

search warrant was obtained.

four

the detention

period, the police told the five that they were free to leave if they
consented to a personal search.

Two of the people agreed and left.

After forty-five minutes, the police returned with a search warrant
for the apartment, but not for any of the people in it.
then

ordered

exposed.

She

Vanessa
turned

Cox
to

Rawlings then claimed

to

empty

Rawlings

the drugs

her

and

and was

The

drugs

what

is

handbag.

said,

"Take

placed

The police

under

were

yours."

arrest.

The

police found $4500 on him a a knife in a sheath.
Rawlings unsuccessfully attempted to suppress the evidence
before

and

reversed

during

his

his

trial,

conviction.

but

The

that

we

find

Kentucky

Kentucky

again, in an extraordinary opinion.
confess

the

the

Supreme

Court
Court

of

Appeals

reversed

yet

The court stated, "All in all we

concept

'standing'

of

totally

incomprehensible and, to the extent of overlap with Fourth Amendment

~~-----------------

rights,

equally

incapable of

understandinq."

The

court

determined

that Rawlings "probably" did not have standing, and then went on to
make

a

rather

convoluted

finding

that

Rawlings

had

no

"automatic"

standing to make a Fourth Amendment challenge because he admitted on
the

spot

that he owned

the drugs.

Finally hitting

on

a

rational

idea, the Court added that, in any event, Rawlings had no "legitimate
or reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion" in
Vanessa Cox's purse.

4.
AUTOMATIC STANDING
The

automatic

standing

doctrine

flows

from

two

perceived

dangers when a defendant charged with a possessory offense attempt to
suppress

evidence

as

illegally

Incrimination" -- By

arguing
the

at

a

"The

Dilemma of

suppression hearinq
seizure

due

in the seized material,

the defendant would prejudice his

case

the

of

possession.

to

that he had

interest

charge

and

Self-

to

substantive

search

1)

standing

on

challenge

seized.

2)

his

property

"The

Vice

of

By opposing standing to make a

Prosecutorial Self-Contradiction"

suppression motion in a possessory case, the Government is placed in
the position of arguing pretrial that a defendant has no interest in
the seized material and at trial that he indeed possessed it.
The

dilemma

of

sel f-iner iminat ion

is

decidedly

less

after the Court's decision in Simmons v. United States, 390

now,

u.s.

377

(1968), which held that a defendant's testimony at a pretrial hearinq
could not be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief.

The defendants

in these cases insist that the dilemma is still very real because the
statements

are

still

admissible

for

inconsistent statements in some

impeachment,

for showinq prior

jurisdictions, and as the basis of

prosecutorial "fishing expeditions."

The SG responds that the proper

solution to those problems -- if

indeed they be problems

extend

situations,

Simmons

to

impeachment

etc.,

"automatic standing" to pursue a pretrial motion.

not

is to
to

grant

Of course, these

cases do not present the question of extending Simmons, so the Court
could

not

strongest

reach

a

claim of

holding

on

that

petrs -- the

suggest ion.

fear

In

addition,

the

of self-incrmination throuqh

impeachment -- is not the sort of claim that has appealed very much

5.

In Harris v. New York, 401

to the Court in recent years.
( 1971),

the

Court

permit ted

violation of Miranda.

impeachment

with

statements

u.s.

222

taken

in

The theory of that case was that a defendant

should not be free to change his story without facing

impeachment.

And in Havens v. United States this Term, the Court has tentatively
resolved to permit anmission of otherwise inadmissable evidence for
impeachment on cross-eximination.

-

The vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction is a thornier
-...,____
--......
First, I am not sure just how grievous a vice it is.
After

issue.
all,

we

permit

propositions.
about
and

to

argue

all

There may be something

having

forth

litigants

the

sorts

of

inconsistent

a bit superficially unsavory

Government bloodthirstily changing its story back

in order to acquire a convict ion.

But,

then again,

the

current focus of Fourth Amendment doctrine on personal "expectations
of

privacy"

that

Jones

pretrial

may

undermine

saw

in

that

the

the

this

law

was

defendant

did

apparent
that
not

claim.

the

The

inconsistency

Government

have

a

would

sufficient

interest in the object to challenge the seizure.

argue

possessory

At trial, however,

the Government's claim would be that the defendant did indeed possess
the

object.

The

SG

goes

throuqh

a

lengthy

argument

based

on

"constructive possession" to demonstrate that there is in fact little
inconsistency between the two positions.
somewhat
commend

tortured
the

responded

to

State
the

and

Fourth

Amendment

-----

f i nd the S G' s position

unpersuasive.

of Kentucky's view.

based on property law
~

eventually

I

Instead,

Kentucky argues

I

would

that Jones

doctrine of

the

day,

however,

the

Court looks to

----

which

was

privacy in each circumstance to determine

6.

whether there is a Fourth Amendment violation.
of

a

particular

determination.

item

is

simply

Under this view,

one

The actual possession

element

of

that

general

the Government argues at pretrial

only that the petr had no legitimate expectation of privacy, not that
he did not possess the seized items.
On balance, I think that Kentucky's approach makes the most
The

sense.

Court

seems

quite

resolved

to

apply

the

"legitimate

,.I..---

expectation of privacy" standard across the board in Fourth Amendment
cases.

Indeed, the law certainly needs a single principle for such

cases.

Rakas jettisoned the "legitimately-on-the-premises" stran.d of }

Jones,

and

automatic
outcome

I

think

it

standing.
might

clearly

The

affect

foreshadowed

naqg ing

defendants

quest ion
in

a

similar

in my mind

setting

trial

junking
is

of

how this

strategy.

A

defendant would be in the position of arguing at the pretrial hearing
that

a

search violated his

legitimate expectation of privacy in a

particular place at a particular time

under certain circumstances.

The deterrninat ion of how legit irnate his expectation was might well
take

into

elephant

account
in

your

the

nature

backyard

of

the

would

not

object
likely

e.g.,
raise

a

keeping

an

legitimate

expectation that the police would not become aware of the elephant's
existence.

To the extent that the inquiry focused on the particular

item, there would be the same logical inconsistency that troubled the
Jones Court.
context,

But the inconsistency seems much less telling in this

where a constellation of factors must be considered.

The

ruling on the suppression motion will also turn on the nature of the
premises, the relationship of the defendant to the premises, and how
the

i tern was

stored.

Indeed, the Government is far more likely to

~

focus on those questions than
the

of

possession

to disprove the defendant's
so

prosecutorial

self-

contradiction seems
Thus,
automatic s

have almost all paled.
problem,

incrirni

initially given by the Jones

reasons

and

the

for \
Simmons reduced the self-

expectation-of-privacy

the Government's self-contradictions.
this case,
I

Court

theory

has

For resolution of this

I would endorse the approach taken in Rakas.

would hold that Fourth Amendment standing doctrine is superseded by

the

privacy-expectation

Thus,

decision.

the

inquiry

on

at

suppression motion should center on whether the officials invaded the
defendant's legitimate expectations of privacy.

Salvucci -- This outcome would resolve the question raised
in Salvucci, and would most likely require a remand to the District
Court

for

findings on

The record in Salvucci does not

-~-- --

reflect the relationship between the defendants and the apartment of
Zackular's mother, nor is there any indication of how the police carne
upon the stolen checks or how the checks had been stored.

All of

those factors would be relevant to a determination on the substantive
question.

Rawlings

-- The record in this case is probably sufficient

to rule on the merits of the

suppression motion.

Rawlings clearly

placed the drugs in Vanessa Cox's purse in order to remove them from
public view.

He was seeking privacy.

I would question whether any

expectation of privacy was reasonable.

He knew that she did not want

8.

to hold the drugs, and also knew that if she consented to a search
they would be found.

Thus, I would affirm the denial of the motion

to suppress.

~lings
five

people

also involves a challenge to the detention of the

in the Marquess

search warrant.

apartment while the

police acquired a

The detention may well have taken place in violation

of the standards outlined in Brown v. Texas last Term.

Certainly the

knife taken from Rawlings did not provide any basis for a Terry stop,
since

he

made

no menacing

gestures.

during

the

do

I

not

think

that

He needs to suppress the drugs

Rawlings can win on this argument.
seized

Still,

search of Vanessa

Cox.

I

do

not

think

he

can

challenge her detention, since Fourth Amendment rights are personal,
not "vicarious."
in here: I

(Admittedly, an element of standing begins to creep

think the Court would be well-advised to avoid using the

terminology, however.)

Once the police had the drugs in her purse,

Rawlings said they were his.

I

see no constitutional infirmity in

this, since there is every reason to believe she would have told the
police they were his, thereby giving the police ample cause to arrest
him.

To

the

extent

unconstitutional,

that

the

detention

Rawlings

of

was

he can point to no particular harm that resulted

from it, since presumably the police could have arrested him anywhere
in

the

state

once

Vanessa

Cox

identified

the

drugs

Consequently, I would also affirm Rawlings' conviction.

as

his.
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S.UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm

l

No. 79-244
United States, Petitioner,

On Writ of Certiorari to United
States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit.
John M. SalvucCI, Jr. and
Joseph G. Zackular.

v.

.

[April -, 1980]

MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Relying on Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960),
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that since
respondents were charged with crimes of possession, they were
entitled to claim "automatic standing" to challenge the legality of the search which produced the evidence against them,
without regard to whether they had an expectation of privacy
in the premises searched. United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.
2d 1094 (1979). Today we hold that defendants charged
with crimes of possession may only claim tlie benefits of the
excluSIOnary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have
a~ u... in fact been violated. The automatic standing rule of Jones t~-:..:.=....v. tFnited States, supra, is therefore overruled.
~

.

1
Respondents, John Salvucci and Joseph Zackular, were
charged in a federal indictment with 12 counts of unlawful possession of stolen mail, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1708.
The 12 checks which formed the basis of the indictment had
been seized by the Massachusetts police during the search of
an apartment renteJi_ b}' resmndent Zackular's mother. The
searcnwas conductedPursuant to a warrant.
Respondents filed a motion to suppress the checks on the
ground that the affidavit supporting the application for the
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search warrant was inadequate to demonstrate probable cause.
The District Court granted respondents' motions and ordered
that the checks be suppressed. 1 The Government sought
reconsideration of the District Court's ruling, colltending that
respondents lacked "standi11g" to challenge the constitutionality of the search. The District Court reaffirmed its suppression order and the government appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that respondents
had "standing" and the search warrant was constitutionally
inadequate. The court fou11d that the respondents were not
required to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the premises searched or the property seized because they were
entitled to assert "automatic standiug" to object to the search
and seizure under Jones v. United States, supra. The court
observed that the vitality of the Jones doctrine had been
challenged in recent years, but that "[u]ntil the Supreme
CourL rules on this questiou, we arc not prepared to hold
that the automatic standing rule of Jones has been ...
overruled. . . . That is an issue which the Supreme Court
must resolve." 599 F. 2d, at 1098. The Court of Appeals
was obviously correct in its characterization of the status of
Jones, and we granted certiorari in order to resolve the coutroversy.~ U. 8 . - (1979).

II
As early as 1907, this Court took the position that remedies
1 The District Court. held that. the ntridnvit wa
deficient becau~e the
affiant I•clied on double hears<LY, and failed to :specify the dates ou which
information included in the affidavit had bPen obtained.
~The courts of appeab haw dividPd on the continued applicability of
the automatic :standing rult•. Tho Sixth Cin·uit abanclonrd thP rule after
our clPci:sion in .Simmons v. United ~tati'S, :390 U. ::3. 377 (196R). Sec,
e. y., C'nited l::itates v. Huuter, 550 F. 2d 1066 (CA6 1977). Most of
the remmmng rircuit~ appear to have retaiuecl the rule, but many w1th
'' mi~givlllgs . " See, e. g., Uuited States v. Oates, 560 F. 2d 45, 52 (CA2
Hl77) ; United States v. Edtcards, 577 F. 2cl H83, 892 (CA5), cort. denied, ,
439 u. . 968 (1978) ,
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for violations of constitutional rights would only be aft'orded
to a person who "belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection is given." Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S.
152, 160. The exclusionary rule is one form of remedy afforded for Fourth Amendmeut violations, and the Court in
Jones v. United States held that the Hatch v. Reardon principle properly limited its availability. The Court reasoned
that ordinarily "it is entirely proper to require of one who
seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he . . . establish, that he
himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy." 362 U. S.,
at 261. Subsequent attempts to vicariously assert violations
of the Fourth Amendmeut rights of others have been repeatedly rejected by this Court. Alderman v. United States,
394 U. S. 165, 174 (1969); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S.
223, 230 (1973). Most recently, in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128 (1978), we held that, "[i]t is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated
to benefit from the [exclusionary] rule's protections." !d.,
at 134.
Even though the Court in Jones recognized that the exclusionary rule should only be available to protect defendants
who have been the victims of an illegal search or seizure, the
Court thought it necessary to establish an exception. In cases
where possession of the seized evidence was an essen£Ialereme'tlt of Q!_e otTense cfi"ar@, t1le Court field tfiat the defendant
was not Ol3Iigated to establish that his own Fourth An endmel n · ts a
e n vw ate , out only that the search and
seizure of the evidence was unconstitutional.a Upon such a
showing, the exclusiouary rule would be available to prevent
the admission of the evidence against the defendant,.
3 ]u Brown v. United States, 411 U. S., at 229, this Court elarified that.
the automatic standing rule of Jones was a,ppliC'ablr only where the offense
rharged "pos~e,~ion of the seized evidence at the t1me of tlw ron1estccl
earch and se1zure."
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The Court found that the prosecution of such possessory
offenses presented a "special problem" which necessitated the
departure from the then-settled principles of Fourth Amendment "standing." 4 Two circumstances were found to require
this exception. First, the Court found that in order to establish standing at a hearing on a motion to suppress, the defendant would often be "forced to allege facts the proof of which
would tend , if indeed not be sufficient, to convict him," since
several Courts of Appeals had "pinioned a defendant within
this dilemma" by holdi11g that evidence adduced at the motion
to suppress could be used against the defendant at trial. 362
r. 8., at 262. The Court declined to embrace any rule which
would require a defendant to assert his Fourth Amendment
claims only at the risk of providing the prosecution with selfincriminatillg statements admissible at trial. The Court
sought resolution of this dilemma by relieving the defendant
of the obligation of establishing that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated by an illegal search or seizure.
The Court also commented that this rule would be beneficial for a second reason. Without a rule prohibiting a government challenge to a defendant's "standing" to invoke the
exclusionary rule in a possessory offense prosecution, the government would be allowed the "advantage of contradictory
positions.·· I d., at 263. The Court reasoned that the government ought not to be allowed to assert that the defendant
possessed the goods for purposes of criminal liability, while
simultaneously asserting that he did not possess them for the
purposes of claiming the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The Court found that, "[i] t is not consonaut with the
4 In Raka,s. this Court di~canl<•cl rdiauce on concepts of "~ta nding " in
determmmg whether a drfendant is rntitled to claim the protectiOn ~ of the
!•xelusJOnar~· rulP . The inquiry, after Rakas, ts simply whethrr thr dcfemhmt '~ rights were violated by the allrgedly Illegal scan·h or ~eizurc .
Becau~c Jones was decided at a time when ";;tanding" wa;; de~ignatrd ns u
·eparale mquir ', we use that. term for the purposes of re-examining that
opinion.
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amenities, to put it mildly, of the administration of criminal
justice, to sanction such squarely contradictory assertions of
power by the Government." !d., at 263-264. Thus in order
to prevent both the risk that self-incrimination would attach
to the assertion of Fourth Amendment rights, as well as to
prevent the "vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction," see
Brown v. United States, 411 U. S., at 229, the £_Ourt adopted
the rule of "automatic standing."
:=.
In ~he 20 years which have lapsed since the Court's decision in Jones, the two reasons which led the Court to the
rule of automatic standing have likewise been aft'ected b time.
This our as he t a testimony given by a defendant in
support of a motion to suppress cannot be admitted as evidence of his guilt at trial. Simmons v. United States, 390
U. S. 377 (1968). Developments in the principles of Fourth
Amendment standing, as well, clarify that a prosecutor may,
with legal consistency and legitimacy, assert that a defendant
charged with possession of a seized item did not have a privacy
interest violated in the course of the search and seizure. We
are convinced not only that the original tenets of the Jones
decision have eroded, but also that no alternative principles
exist to support retention of the rule.

The "dilemma" identified Ain Jones, that a

delendan~

with a possessory oft'ense might only be able to establish his
standing to challenge a search am] seizure by giving selfincriminating testimony admissible as evidence of his guilt,
was elimiuated by our decision in Simmons v. United States,
S'Upra. In Simmons, the defendant Garrett was charged with
bank robbery. During the search of a codefendaut's mother's
house, physical evidence used in the bank robbery, including
a suitcase, was found in tli~ basement and seized. In au
eft'ort to establish his standing to assert the illegality of the
search , Garrett testified at the suppression hearing that the,
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suitcase was similar to one he o-w11ed and that he was the
owner of the clothing discovered inside the suitcase. Garr<'tt's motion to suppress was denied. but his testimony
wa admitted into evidencr against him as part of tfie governnwn s case-m-e ne at rial. This Court reversed. finding
that "n drf<'IJdant who knO\n~ that hiF: trstimony may be
adrnissiblc against him at trial will sometimes be deterred
from preseuting the testimonial proof of standing 11ecessary
to assert a Fourth Amendment claim." 390 U. S., at 392-393.
The Court found that in effect, the defendant was
"obliged either to give up what he belirvecl. with advice
of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendm<'nt claim or, in
legal effect. to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-i1lcrimination. In these circumstances. we
find it intolerable that one constitutional right should
have to be surrrnderecl in order to assert another. We
therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in support
of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment
grounds. his testimony may not thereafter be admitted
against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes
no objection." Id., at 394.
This Court's ruliug in Simmons thus not only extends protectiou against this risk of self-incrimination in all of the
cases covered by Jones, but also grants a form of "use immunity" to those defendants charged with nonpossessory
crimes. [n this respect. the protection of Simmons is therefore broader than that of Jones. Thus as we stated in Brown
v. tlntted Sta:fes, 411 U. S., at 228, "[tlhe self-incrimination
dilemma, so central to tho Jones decision, can no longer occur
under the prevailing interpretation of tho Constitution [in
Simmons]."

B
This Court has identified the self-incrimination rationale as
the cornerstone of the Jones opinion. See Brown v. United
~tates; 411 U. S., at 228. We need not belabor the question
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of whether the "vice" of prosecutorial contradiction could
alone support a rule countenancing the exclusion of probative
evidence on the grounds that someone other than the defendant
was denied a Fourth Amendment right. The simple answer
is that the decisions of this Court, especially our most recent
decision in Rakas v. Illinois, supra, clearly establish that a
prosecutor may simultalleously maintain that a defendant
criminally possessed the seized good, but was not subject to a
Fourth Amendment deprivation, without legal contradiction.
To conclude that a prosecutor engaged in self-contradiction
in J o·nes, the Court necessarily relied on the unexamined assumption that a defendallt's possession of a seized good sufficient to establish criminal culpability was also sufficient to
establish Forth Amendment "standing." This assumption,
however, even if correct at the time, is no longer so."
The person in legal possession of a good seized during an
illegal search has not necessarily been subject to a Fourth
Amendment deprivation. 0 As we hold today in Rawlings v.
Kentucky, post, at-, legal possession of a seized good is not
a proxy for determining whether the owner had a Fourth
Amendment iHterest for it does not invariably represent the
protected Fourth Amendment interest. This Court has repeatedly repudiated the notion that "arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law" ought to control our Fourth
5 Re::;pondent Salvucci rile thi,; ,.,tourt '::; dPei~ion in United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) , a~ ~npifort, for the view that. legal ownen;hip

of the ~eizNl gooJ wa.~ ~ufiiriPJit . to ronfer Fout.h Amendment, "::;tanding."
In Rakas, however, we ~tated that. "f::<ltancling i11 !Pffers wa::< ba;;:ed on
Jeffrr::;' po&~e~::;ory intere,;t in both thr prrmi::<r;-; searchrd a11d tho property
seized ." 439 r. S., at 1:36 . (Empha~>i~ ad(IPd.)
" Legal po,;se~::;iou of tlw ::;eizrd good may WE'll bE' suiJ-iciPn! to Pnt.itle it
rlofE>ndant to dnim the benefit~ of the Pxclusionar~· rule if !he seizure, as
oppOH('d to the HP<trch, was illE-gal. SPP, e. g., United ' State/! v. Lisk, 5~2
F . 2d 228 (CA7 1975), rert. denied, .,12;3 U. S. 107i:l (1976) (STEVENS, J .).
HrspondE>utK, however, did not challengr the ron::;tttutJonality of the:
seiznrp or the evidence.
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Amendment inquiry. Ralws v. lll·inois, 439 U. S., at 143. In
another section of the opinion in Jones its<.'lf, the ourt concluded that, "it is unnec0ssary and ill-advised to import into
the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable se·arches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body
of private prop0rty law . . . . " 362 U. S .. at 266. See also
MancUiri v. DeForte, 302 U. S. 364 (1968); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
While prop<>rty ownership is clearly a factor to be considered 'ill determini,!!$ whether l:!:ll. mdividual's Fourtl;A;endment rights hav~ been ;rol~ted. see Rakas, SU{Yf'a, 439 U. S ..
at 144, n. 12, prOj)erty rights are neither the beginning nor
the f'nd of this Court's inquiry. In Rakas, this Court held ~
that an ill<' gal sf'arch only violates the rights of those who
have "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place." 'Rakas, -!d. , at 140. See aTso Mancus~ v. DeForte,

-

supra.

We simply decline to usc possession of a seized good as a
substitute for a fa;etual finding that the owner of the good
had a legitimate' expectation of privacy in the area searched.
Tn Jones, thf' Court held not only that automatic standing
should be conferred to defendants charged with crin1f's of
]Jossession, but altematively, that Jones had actual standing
because he was "legitimately on the premises" at the time of
the search. In Rakas, this Court rejected the adequacy of
this second Jones sta11darcl. finding that it was "too broad a
gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights." 439
U. S., at 142. In languag<> appropriate to our consideration
of the automatic standing rule as well. W<' reasoned that :
"In abandoning 'legitimately on premises' for the doctrine that we announce today, we are not forsaking a
time-tested and workable rule, which has produced consistent results when applied, solely for the sake of fidelity
to the values underlying· the Fourth Amendment,
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Rather, we are rejecting blind adherence to a phrase
which at most has superficial clarity and which conceals
underneath that thin veneer all of the problems of line
drawing which must be faced in any conscientious effort
to apply the Fourth Amendment. Where the fa.ctual
premises for a rule are so generally prevalent that little
would be lost and much would be gained by abandoning
'Case-by-case analysis, we have not hesitated to do so ... .
We would not wish to be understood as saying that legitimate presence on the premises is irrelevant to one's expectation of privacy, but it cannot be deemed controlling."
Jd. , at 147- 148.

Ln

As in Rakas, we again reject "blind adherence" to the other
underlying assumption in Jones that possession of the seized
good is an acceptable measure of Fourth Amendment interests.
As in Rakas, we find that the Jones standard "creates too
broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights"
and that we must instead engage in a "conscientious effort to
apply the Fourth Amendment" by asking not merely whether
the defendant had a possessory interest in the items seized,
but whether he had an expectation of privacy in the area
searched. Thus neither prosecutorial "vice," nor the underlying assumption of Jones that possession of a seized good is
J the equivalent of :F'ourth Ame:idment "standing" to challenge
the search, can save the automatic standing rule.

c
Even though the original foundations of Jones have crumbled, respondents assert that principles not articulated by the
Court in Jones support retention of the rule. First, ~
-:+
Ll(<~e.;~S~f~
O
~\J~~~~~
~
:
\H~S:_j~~b~
·g~n~8+Srs maintain that while Simmons v. United States, supra,
\
~liminated the possibility that the prosecutor could use a
defendant's testimo11y at a suppression hearing as substantive
evidence of guilt at trial, Simmons did not eliminate other
risks to the defendant which attach to giving testimony at a
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motion to suppress. 7 Principally, respoudents assert that the
prosecutor may still be permitted to use the defendant's testimony to impeach him at trial,S This Court has not decided
whether Simmons precludes the use of a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing to impeach his testimony at.
trial. 9 But the issue prese11ted here is quite different from
the one of whether "use immunity" extends only through the
government's case-in-chief, or beyond that to the direct and
cross-examination of a defendant in the event he chooses to
take the stand. That issue need not be and is not resolved
here, for it is an issue which more aptly relates to the proper
breadth of the Simmons privilege, and not to the need for
retaining automatic standing.
Respondents also seek to retain the Jones rule on the
grounds that it is said to maximize the deterrence of illegal
police conduct by permitting an expanded class of potential
challengers. The same a.r gument has been rejected by this
Court as a sufficient basis for allowing persons whose Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated to nevertheless claim
The re:>pondent.-; argue that the JH'o::;pcutor's acce~s to the suppr<'~~ion
te.,timony will unfairly providE' tlw pro><ecutor with information Hdvantagpou~ to the' prepar<ltion of hi:; case and trial ::;tratPgy. Thi>< argumPnt,
however, is sure!~· apphrabiP equally to pos:;e;:;:;or~· and nonpOI"SP~sory
offenses. This Court. has ckarly dPclined to expand thE' Jones rule' to
other claH::es of oti<:>u8eB, Alderman v. Unzted States. Brown v. Ulllted
States, and thm; reo;pon<hmtH' rational<' eannot support the' retentwn of a
:;;prcial rulr of automatic standing hC're.
8 A number of court;,; con::;iclering the que:;tion hav<:> held that such l<'><timony i:-l admissible' a:; pvidente of impParhmPnt. Gray v. State, 43 l\1d.
App. 2:~t:, 408 A. Zd 85:3 (1979); People "· DouglWJ, ()() Cal. App. 3d 998,
13() Cal. Rptr. 358 (Hl77); People v. Sturgis. 58 Ill. 2cl 211, 317 K. E. 2cl
545 (Hl74) . SC'e al:<o ·woodie Y. United States,- U.S. App. D. C. - ,
:mo~ F. 2d 130, 131-132 (BuRoEH, .1.), cPrt. denied, 389 U.S. 961 (1967).
0 Thi~ Court hat'! hPld that, ''the protectiw ~hielcl of Simmons is uot lo
he convrrtecl into a Jicpn:;e for fabc represC'nt<Ltion:; . . •. " United States:
v. Kaha11 , 415 U.S. 239 (1974) ,
7
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the benefits of the exclusionary rule. In Alderman, v. United
States, supra, 394 U.S., at 174-175, we explicitly stated that:
"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of
those whose rights the police have violated have been
considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evide11ce even though the case against the defendant
is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment.
But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of
extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would
justify further encroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence
which exposes the truth."
See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S., at 137; United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268. 275-276 (1978); United States v.
/ Calandr·a, 414 U. S. 338, 350-351 (1974). Respondents' deterrence argument carries no special force in the context of
possessory offenses and we therefore again reject it.
We are convinced that the automatic standing rule of Jones
has outlived its usefulness in this Court's Fourth Ameudment
jurisprudence. The doctriue now serves only to afford a windfall to defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have not
been violated. We are unwilling to tolerate the exclusion of
probative evidence under such circumstances since we adhere
to the view of Alderman that the values of the Fourth Amendment are fully preserved by a rule which limits the availability of the exclusionary rule to defendants who have been
subjected to a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.
This action comes to us as a challenge to a pretrial decision
suppressing evidence. The respondents relied on automatic
standing and did not attempt to establish that they had a
legitimate expectation of priva:cy in the areas of Zackular's
mother's home where the goods were seized. We therefore
think it appropriate to remand so that respondents will have

79-244-0PINION

12

UNITED STATES v. SALVUCCI

an opportunity to demonstrate, if they can, that their own
Fourth Amendment rights were violated. See Combs v.
United States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972) .
Remanded.
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